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Abstract 
In this paper two issues regarding time preference in the economie analysis of 
public investment projects will be treated simultaneously, viz. a critical re-
view of the literature on the use and the value of the social rate of discount, 
and a review of arguments advocating the use of flexible discount rates. 
The paper will try to critically discuss the literature from three perspectives, 
viz. time preference (including intergenerational distribution), opportunity costs, 
and risk behaviour. It will be demonstrated that - depending on policy objectives 
and specifie circumstances - a variable discount rate may well be defended on eco-
nomie grounds. The paper presents also an attempt at incorporating a social welfare 
approach (including inter alia consumption, uncertainty, multiple generations, and 
externalities) in public project evaluation. Here it is shown that - under fairly 
general circumstances - a variable discount rate is in agreement with a social 
welfare approach. 
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1. Introduction 
The element of time has two dimensions in economie analysis, viz. as a scarce 
commodity and as the multi-period trajectory along which the impacts of economie 
activities are spread out. 
The first dimension is extensively studied in the economics of leisure time 
(e.g., recreation economics) and of job search behaviour. In this context it is 
taken for granted that leisure time is a constituent of (individual or social) 
welfare, so that the maximization of welfare has to take place subject to a set 
of constraints among which income and time are the most prominent ones. Time 
is then essentially regarded as a commodity to be consumed: more leisure time will 
increase somebody's welfare, but will on the other hand leave less possibilities for 
earning income (thus leading to a decline in welfare). Consequently, leisure time 
and income are to some extent substitutes, so that utility maximization has to in-
clude a trade-off between these different welfare components. This trade-off has 
no doubt important implications for housing search behaviour and its related labour 
market and traffic aspects. As this field of analysis is well developed in economics, 
no further attention will be given to this issue in the present paper. 
The second dimension, viz. the multi-period trajectory of impacts of economie 
activities, takes for granted that welfare has to be measured essentially along 
a long-term evolutionary path (either as a continuüm or as a series of subsequent 
discrete time intervals). Furthermore, it is worth noting that in general the 
(individual or social) utility of a good or service declines over time, if its 
actual use has to be postponed. In other words, in order to judge the present 
utility of a good or service which becomes available at a certain later point in 
time, a so-called rate of discount has to be applied in order to calculate its 
present value. The analysis of this problem of a discount rate has already a 
long history in economics; it has been studied extensively in financial economics 
in relation to decisions of private entrepreneurs, and in welfare economics in re-
lation to decisions of public agencies. 
In the 1920s already, various economists (Hotelling, Pigou, Ramsey) have devoted 
attention to time preferences in economie choice analysis (see also Heal, 1981). 
Especially Pigou has called attention for the problem. of myopie behaviour of an 
individual decision-maker suffering from a faulty telescopic faculty, necessitating 
a government to counteract the citizens' short-sightedness. Since the 1970s this 
issue of efficiency and equity has again become prominent in economie analysis. 
In the literature two main streams may be distxnguished in the framework of long-
term public decision-making, viz. a Utilitarian and a Rawlsian viewpoint (cf. also 
Grout, 1971). 
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Briefly speaking, a Utilitarian view on long-run planning would suggest a 
course of action which would maximize all net benefits to all people involved 
during the whole planning period. Assuming a certain weight for the future 
streams of benefits (i.e., a social rate of discount), the Utilitarian framework 
constitutes essentially the foundation of modern social cost-benefit analysis based 
on efficiency considerations. 
A Rawlsian approach is essentially more distribution-oriented, as it states inter 
alia that social and economie inequalities are to be arranged so that they are to 
the greatest benefit of the least advantaged (see Rawls, 1972). This maxmin 
principle of justice could also be. applied in an intertemporal context by stating 
that especially those public policies should be pursued that maximize within a 
certain planning horizon the well-being of those individuals or groups with mini-
mum well-being. Rawls' social justice theory has been elaborated by Solow (1974) 
for a situation with multiple generations. He formulated an optimum control maxi-
mum principle for intergenerational distribution, viz., maximize the welfare of 
that generation which derives the lowest welfare level from the consumption of 
a finite stock of resources. A reformulation of the result of a Rawlsian approach 
in terms of a Utilitarian framework would no doubt mean a flexible social rate 
of discount which has to be adjusted in each planning period. 
The difference between the Utilitarian efficiency principle and the Rawlsian 
equity principle has been a source of controversies in economie thinking and is 
also one of the causes of diverging views on the use and relevance of the social 
rate of discount. Both the question of a fixed or flexible social discount rate 
and the determination of the optimal value of this discount rate are related to 
market-oriented efficiency criteria and to socially-oriented distribution criteria 
for the evaluation of multi-temporal utility streams of individuals, groups or 
society as a whole. Thus the socio-economic meaning of time preference is at 
stake in this discussion. 
The present paper will mainly pay attention to two interconnected issues regarding 
time preferences in the economie analysis of public investments, viz. the use and 
value of the social rate of discount, and the need for a variable (or flexible) social 
discount rate in public decision-making. 
First, the literature on long-term planning and related social rates of discount 
will briefly, systematically and critically be reviewed from three perspectives, 
viz. social time preference (including intergenerational distribution), opportunity 
costs (e.g., in terms of alternative uses of scarce resources), and risk behaviour 
based on lack of information. It will be demonstrated that - depending on specific 
public projects, policy objectives and/or circumstances - a variable discount rate 
may be justified on economie grounds. Finally, the paper provides also a brief 
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discussion of a social welfare approach to long-term public decision-making (in-
cluding consumption growth, uncertainty, multiple generations and externalities). 
It is shown here that - under fairly general circumstances - a variable discount 
rate is in agreement with a social welfare approach. 
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2. The Social Rate of Discount 
In evaluating public projects (e.g., irrigation plans, social security systems, 
educational systems, infras tructure plans) which cover multiple time periods, one 
is usually confronted with the question as to how to evaluate the advantages and 
disadvantages of such projects over a series of years. Three pro,blems emerge in 
this framework:.(1) the precise assessment of all impacts of each of these projects; 
(2) the translation of these impacts into a monetary denominator in order to gauge 
in each period the costs and benefits of these projects; and (3) the assignment of 
weights to the annual flows of costs and benefits in order to calculate the present 
value of the whole project (the problem of the social rate of discount). 
The aggregate weighted flows of all costs and benefits leads to the net present 
value of the project concerned. If one adopts the efficiency criterion that projects 
have to be selected on the basis of their contribution to the total net. present value, 
one may use the following formal decision criterion: 
T 
Y =
 t|, (Bt - Ct)/(l+r)t , 
where: 
Y = net present value 
B = monetary benefits 
C = monetary costs 
r = social rate of discount 
t = time period 
The abovementioned weights are in fact equal to l/(l+r) . Clearly, the problem of 
a multi-period evaluation of public projects boils essentially down to the assess-
ment of these weights. This is an intriguing question, as the selection of a public 
project will - to some extent - depend on the value of the social rate of discount. 
A theoretically justifiable and unambiguous value of the social rate of discount is 
however hard to find. In many cases (for instance, project evaluation by the World 
Bank) ad hoc rules are adopted, based on uniform discounting percentages (e.g. a 
value of 10 percent). Such uniform discounting principles have unfortunately two 
disadvantages: (1) they favour only projects with short - and medium-term benefits, 
while long-term benefits are not taken into account due to a high social rate of 
discount; (2) they do not take into consideration specific circumstances, specific 
policy objectives, or lack of insight, and hence are not tailor-made with respect 
to specific projects. 
Theoretically, the assessment of the optimum social rate of discount may be based 
on classical consumer theory, in which the decision to realize or to postpone the 
consumption of a good or service depends on the preference structure of the actor 
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at hand. In a multi-period situation, the slope of an indifference curve (reflecting 
the marginal rate of substitution of current for future consumption) corresponds to 
the rate of time preference, on which basis it may be decided how many units of a 
commodity will be consumed in subsequent periods. Generally, people prefer current 
to future consumption, so that this positive rate of time preference implies that 
future flows of consumption have to be discounted in order to detsermine their present 
value. 
If the foregoing ideas are applied to public decision-making, it is evident that 
a government has to take into consideration the society's interest in present and 
future consumption. In view of the (frequently assumed) myopie behaviour of indi-
viduals, it is then usually taken for granted that - especially in a long-term 
planning context (e.g., resource management) - a government has to base its decisions 
on a longer planning horizon and on a deeper concern for future generations than 
is normally done in individual decision-making. This leads to the question whether 
in public decision-making a social rate of discount should be used that is lower 
than the (individual) opportunity cost of postponing the consumption of goods or 
services. There is a vast amount of literature on these aspects of the social rate 
of discount, but so far no consensus has been reached about the proper value of this 
discount rate due to lack of insight into externalities, risks, impacts of taxation, 
financial mechanisms on capital markets, social time preferences, and interests of 
future generations (see also Nijkamp and Rouwendal, 1985). 
In the light of the previous remarks the question may be raised whether the usual 
market rate of interest may be a reasonable proxy for the social rate of discount. 
This seems to be a plausible choice, as the market rate of interest may be regarded 
as the profitability attached by society to a certain capital investment. Consequent-
ly, it is sometimes claimed that an allocative efficiency for public resources can 
be reached by imposing the same profitability criteria as for the private sector. 
However, various (theoretical and practical) objections can be raised against an • 
approximation of the social rate of discount via the market rate of interest, some 
of them will be mentioned here. 
- the market rate of interest is co-determined by time preferences of individuals 
who are not necessarily concerned with future interests of themselves or of society 
as a whole. Immediate consumption is preferred to future consumption of the same 
quantity of goods, so that the intertemporal allocation of scarce resources is 
unevenly distributed in the detriment of future generations. Thus the market rate 
of interest is in itself not optimal, so that its use in the context of public 
choice behaviour may do harm to the next generation: its value is than higher than 
the level which would correspond to long-term socio-economic interests. 
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- the market rate of interest does not adequately reflect the opportunity costs of 
public projects. In general, the scarce resources spent on a public project are 
only profitable if theyyield higher socio-economic benefits than when these resources 
would have been used in the private sector. Due to the disturbing effects of taxes 
and due to substitution effects between public investments and public consumption, 
the market rate of interest does not adequately represent the opportunity costs of 
a public project. 
- the risk inherent in public projects is of a different nature than that in private 
investments. First, public projects are more diversified than private investments, 
and secondly there is a higher spread of risks in investments in the public sector. 
As such risks have different consequences compared to the private sector, the market 
rate of interest is not a good proxy for the social rate of discount in case of 
risky public projects. 
The foregoing arguments have demonstrated the inadequacy of the use of the market 
rate of interest as a proxy for the social rate of discount. In the light of this 
problem, two different viewpoints regarding the determination of the social rate of 
discount can be distinguished. The first one is very much ad hoc, and uses a fixed 
rate of discount for all public projects irrespective of their specific features 
(like risks, planning horizon e t c ) . This provides a solid basis for a cross-compara-
tive consistency in the evaluation of different projects, but it neglects the speci-
ficity and uniqueness of various public projects, so that various important long-term 
socio-economic benefits may get lost. The second option is to use a flexible social 
discount rate, depending on the duration of the project, the concern for future gene-
rations, and specific attributes or impacts of the project concerned. In the sequel 
the attention will mainly be focused on the latter issue. Three different aspects 
will successively be discussed, viz. time preference and multiple generations (section 
3), opportunity costs (section 4) and risk elements (section 5). 
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3. Time Preference and Future Generations 
Instantaneous need satisfaction is a form of (socio-) psycbological impatience 
with far-reaching economie consequences. It raeans that a postponement of current 
consumption toward a future period is only acceptable if its resulting welfare loss 
is compensated for by means of a 'shadow price' (or social rate of discount) re-
flecting the economie sacrifice of this welfare loss. Consequently, the present 
value of one unit of consumption in period t has a higher value than that in 
period t+x (T >_ 1). In this section various types of impatience and its economie 
consequences will briefly be discussed, foliowed by a concise systematic review of 
the literature. 
3.1. Pure Impatience 
Assume a stationary economy marked by exactly equal conditions (economie pros-
pects, preference structures etc.) in the time interval [t, t+x]. Society in this 
period can make a choice between consuming x units of goods either now or later, 
while it does not have the possibility to put the resources concerned in a savings 
bank. In this case impatience is the only justification for preferring immediate 
consumption. This leads of course to a situation where the intertemporal allocation 
of resources is in favour of current periods. 
It should be added however that various situations can be imagined where it is 
reasonable to postpone immediate consumption (e.g., in cases of satiation). This im-
plies of course a negative time preference. In general, however, it is assumed that 
people have a positive time preference, caused by some degree of impatience. 
The consequence of this impatience is that future interests (e.g., of next gene-
rations) are systematically and structurally overlooked, as the level of savings 
and hence of investments is too low. A government which aims at achieving a maximum 
welfare for both the present and the next generation should try to restore the balance 
by discouraging the effects of impatience through the use of a social rate of dis-
count which is lower than the normal market rate of interest. 
One of the most well-known representatives of this view was Pigou (1924), who 
stated that 'defective telescopic faculty' caused (irrational) patience of society. 
The government - being the 'trustee for unborn generations' - should then try to in-
terfere in favour of future generations. Similar views have also been expressed by 
previous economists (e.g., Marshall, Bentham), who drew attention to the lack of 
concern for the future (reflected inter alia in the low savings rate of low income 
groups). In this framework it was assumed that an increase in welfare would also 
reduce the degree of impatience (cf. Blaug, 1978, p. 530). 
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In the post-war period less attention has been paid by economists to situations 
of pure impatience. Even the term 'impatience' was increasingly subBtituted by the 
more neutral concept of 'time preference'. Whether this situation confirms Marshali's 
view that the phenomenon of impatience will disappear with a further increase in 
welfare is however hard to demonstrate, as economists appear to defend contrasting 
views on this phenomenon. For instance, Stigler and Becker (1977) claim that this 
phenomenon is not relevant anymore, whereas Olson and Bailey (1981) claim that they 
have convincingly demonstrated its existence and relevance. It should be noted 
however, that in any case the assumption of an increase in welfare violates the 
ceteris paribus conditions of the pure impatience case. This issue will be further 
taken up in the next subsection. 
3.2. Economie growth 
Assume a society without pure impatience, but facing a situation of (expected) 
economie growth. If in a situation with rising incomes one has to choose between 
x units of extra consumption now or later, and if one assumes the (usual) case 
of declining marginal Utilities, it is clear that current consumption will be pre-
ferred to future consumption, as the extra utility is at present higher than in 
the future (cf. Blaug, 1978, p. 528). In this case, the time preference is in 
agreement with rational behaviour and an optimal allocation of resources. The inte-
rest of future generations is not affected and there is no need for government inter-
vention. 
In conclusion, time preferences are - in a situation of economie growth - not 
necessarily detrimental to the interest of the next generation. 
3.3. Limited lifetime 
It is worth noting, that there is an intermediate case between choice behaviour 
based on pure impatience and economie growth, viz. the case of a limited lifetime. 
If an individual expects to die (with a certain probability) in the time interval 
[t, t+t], it is plausible that a rational person chooses in favour of more short-
term consumption (despite the future prospects of a higher income level). This 
is a good example of rational risk-avoiding behaviour at the individual level. 
It is however an intriguing question, whether this kind of individual rationality 
is favourable for society as a whole. Seen from the viewpoint of society as a 
whole, individual instantaneous consumption is not in agreement with the interest 
of future generations: individuals die, but society remainsl In other words, in 
a stationary economie situation society is neutral with respect to current or future 
flows of extra consumption. Thus .the multi-period allocation of resources in an 
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economy is biased toward the short-run interest of rational individuals. This situ-
ation may also justify public intervention in view of future interests (cf. Mueller, 
1974). 
3.4. Distributional aspects of multi-period savingsbehaviour 
A valid counter-argument against the short-term rationality motive of individuals 
is that most individuals base their consumption decisions to some extent on social 
considerations regarding their children and/or grandchildren, so that this kind of 
(rational) social behaviour will reduce the effects o"f the limited life time argument. 
However, in this context Sen (1961, 1967) has argued that only part of somebody's 
current savings will favour his own (grand)children due to the re-distribution 
mechanism implied by succession rights. Due to the limited long-term impact of such 
social motives, the present generation's propensity to save may still be relatively 
low. 
Thus society as a whole is facing a difficult choice problem: if nobody would save, 
the interests of future generations would be dramatically affected. This situation 
is essentially a case of a free-riders problem: a strategie choice in favour of 
deviant (i.e., non-joining or non-cooperative) behaviour is only profitable, if the 
majority of actors adopts the same strategy. In our case, a free riders' strategy 
caused by the financial redistribution mechanism may discourage the savings pro-
pensity of society as a whole, so that this may be a reason for the government to 
actively stimulate savings behaviour in order to protect the interests of the next 
generations. 
3.5. Concluding remarks 
From the previous observations it may be concluded that the interest rate may be 
too high to be in agreement with the interest of future generations, although this 
view is sometimes questioned (see for instance Stiglitz, 1982). In this framework 
a major problem is the lack of consensus on the value of the social rate of discount 
reflecting the time preference of society. Furthermore, in a representative democratie 
system composed of short-term oriented individuals it will be difficult for a govern-
ment to legitimate itself as a trustee for unborn generations. At best the motive 
of coping with the free riders problem may be used as a valid argument for public 
intervention, as this problem is the result of a succession legislation edicted by 
the government itself. Consequently, in many cases the treatment of the interests 
of future generations is in the first place a matter of altruism and benevolence of 
the present generation (see also Kirsch, 1984). 
In this context Marglin (1963a) has made a distinction between two types of be-
haviour of 'the same individual',viz. egocentric behaviour prevailing in normal 
economie market behaviour, and altruistic behaviour prevailing in socio-political 
evaluation processes. This distinction may clarify that people marked by (irrational) 
impatience (reflected also in their savingsbehaviour and concern for new generations) 
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support a government that regards the concern for the future as an explicit policy 
aim. 
The concern for future generations presupposes insight into their interests (which 
is an almost impossible task). Of course, one may assume that the interests of the 
present and future generation are the same, so that one may apply the analysis of 
intra-generational distribution problems to that of inter-generational ones (see, 
for instance, Muéller, 1974, Pearce, 1983, and Solow, 1974), but such attempts did 
not appear to be very successful or realis tic. Given the lack of insight into future 
developments and into the needs of future generations, it was claimed by Sen (1982) 
that it is a meaningful current policy strategy to keep as many options open as possible 
for future generations. 
An alternative approach was proposed by Iwema and Klaassen (1981) and Rouwendal 
and Nijkamp (1984), who made an attempt at assessing the explicit long-term impacts 
of a public project for future generations, so that by means of a trade-off system 
(based on specific generational discount rates) the various effects could be evaluated 
with respect to each other. In this framework even situations with overlapping gene-
rations can be taken into consideration (see Rouwendal and Nijkamp, 1984). 
3.6. Compact literature survey 
After the presentation of various aspects of time preference in the evaluation of 
public decisions, Table 1 gives now a brief systematic presentation of a (selected 
and non-exhaustive) set of views by different authors (in alphabetic order) on time 
preference analysis in public decision-making, with particular emphasis on intergene-
rational allocation of resources. Clearly, this concise presentation does not entire-
ly do justice to the various considerations of the respective authors. 
pure economie limited distribu- intergeneration; 
impatience growth lifetime tional aspects allocation 
authors (subsectian feubsection | (subsection 
V
 3.3) 
(suosection 3.4) 
Feldstein (1964) + + 
Harrison (1981) - + -
Iwema & Klaassen (1981) + 
Kirsch (1984) + 
Kula (1985) + + 
Marglin (1963a) -
Mueller (1974) - + 
Pearce (1983) + 
Pigou (1920) -
Ramsey (1928) -
Rouwendal & Nijkamp(1984) + 
Schulze et al. (1981) + 
Sen (1961, 1967) -
Solow (1974) 
, 
+ 
Table 1. Aspects of time preference and multiple generations dealt with by 
different authors. 
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From all authors, Feldstein (1964) is the only one who does not reject 'pure' time 
preference (or 'irrational impatience') as a real phenomenon. Harrison (1981) can be 
regarded as a modern representative of Pigovian views on the dangers of a pure impatience. 
Surprisingly enough, Ramsey (1928) is a Standard reference in the international litera-
ture, although he pays in his article only with one sentence attention to the phenomenon 
of time preference (qualified by him as 'ethically indefensible'). Kula (1985) is one 
of the few authors who incorporates the phenomenon of a limited lifetime as a real datum 
for fixing a social rate of discount in his analysis. 
The fifth column of Table 1 indicates the fairly large number of authors who have ex-
plicitly paid attention to the importance of an intergenerational distribution of wel-
fare, before a reasonable social rate of discount can be determined. 
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4. Opportunity Costs 
It has been demonstrated in the previous section that in general the social rate of 
discount (reflecting the society's preferences regarding the intertemporal allocation 
of resources) is lower than the market rate of interest. Does this imply that in all 
cases the evaluation of public projects has to be based on this social rate of discount? 
To answer this question it is worth noting that the implementation of public projects 
requires the use of financial resources from the private sector. In many cases, the 
application of the market rate of interest yields for these resources in the private 
sector a higher rate of return than the social rate of discount would do. In general, 
private investments should have a rate of return which is at least equal to the gross 
market rate of interest (the usual market rate including the effects of taxation and 
subsidies). According to some authors (e.g., Hirschleifer, 1966) the government should 
therefore use the gross market rate of.interest for the evaluation of public projects, 
as the use of the traditional social rate of discount (which is lower than the market 
rate) would lead to a transfer of scarce resources to less profitable projects. There 
appears to be a wide spectrum of views on this issue, and in the sequel of this section 
various standpoints will briefly be presented, foliowed again by a concise literature 
survey. 
4.1. Pure opportunity costs 
Advocates of the 'pure opportunity costs' viewpoint claim that financing public in-
vestments means that financial resources have to be transferred from the private to 
the public sector. However, such a transfer is only meaningful from an economie view-
point, if the social rate of discount for public projects is equal to the marginal 
rate of return in the private sector (reflecting the pure opportunity costs). 
This viewpoint does not necessarily hold in all cases, as the financial resources 
for public projects are usually not entirely paid by the private sector: they may also 
originate from the consumption'sector. For the latter part the social rate of discount 
may be a reasonable evaluation criterion, although it has to be added that just the 
consumption sector is the ultimate main driving force for the high rate of return on 
capital investments (see Baumol, 1968). This crowding-out effect will be further dis-
cussed in subsection 4.2. 
4.2. Crowding-out effects 
The implementation of public projects implies crowding-out effects in both the 
consumption sector and the investment sector. According to Sandmo and Drèze (1971), 
the optimum rate of discount for public projects should therefore be a weighted average 
of the conventional social rate of discount (related to crowding-out effects for con-
sumption) and the marginal rate of return on private capital (related to crowding-out 
- 13 -
effects for investments)• This - as such plausible - viewpoint involves however 
various difficulties, as the long-run effects of changes in consumption on the marginal 
rate of return on capital have to be assessed,. while also the effects of shifts in 
investments have to be gauged. Furthermore, the rë-investment possibilities and their 
long-run implications have to be considered (Marglin, 1963b). This re-investment problem 
will be further taken up in sub-section 4.3. 
4.3. Crowding-out and re-investment effects 
The implications of crowding-out and re-investment effects can be clarified as 
follows (see also Arrow, 1966, p. 20). Assume a project which requires in the initial 
base year one unit of investments, while next this project yields a fixed amount of 
revenues in all subsequent years (being a fixed percentage of the initial investment). 
The naive use of the social rate of discount (thus without considering the opportunity 
costs) would require that the abovementioned rate of return is at least equal to the 
social rate of discount. 
However, the revenues accruing from the initial investment lead to an increase in 
both consumption and savings. Depending on the savings rate in an economy, the amount 
of investments and hence of future consumption may increase. Thus the net social value 
(or the shadow price) of the initial amount of investments is equal to the net present 
value of all extra consumption possibilities caused by this investment. This implies 
that public investments marked by crowding-out effects and re-investment possibilities 
have to be evaluated - in a situation of a steady economie growth - by means of the 
social rate of discount. Consequently, crowding-out effects of a public investment 
require that the resources transferred from the private sector be multiplied with the 
abovementioned shadow price. Analogously, re-investment effects (implying that the 
revenues of public investments flow back to the private sector) have to be multiplied 
with the same shadow price. The resulting costs and benefits can then be evaluated 
by means of the usual social rate of discount. 
If the assumptions underlying the previous analysis (i.e., a fixed savings rate and 
a fixed marginal rate of return) are no longer satisfied, the latter conclusion does 
no longer hold (see Bradford, 1975, and Mendelsohn, 1981). 
4.4. Second-best choices 
In general, the problem of opportunity costs is caused by the second-best situation 
in which public investments are taking place. The reasons why public projects in stead 
of private projects are being carried out are not always unambiguous, while also various 
indirect effects of the transfer of financial resources may emerge. Consequently, it 
is sometimes argued (see Stiglitz, 1982) that one would have to examine which restriction 
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and disturbances are relevant for each project. General conclusions can hardly be 
inferred in that case, as the specific opportunity costs inherent in a certain public 
project preclude an unambiguous determination of the appropriate rate of discount 
for that project (which is then unequal to the social rate of discount, the marginal 
rate of return on capital or their weighted average). 
4.5. Concluding remarks 
The opportunity costs of public projects hamper a straight-forward assessment and 
use of a social rate of discount. The 'hunt for a solution in the dark jungles of 
the second best' (Baumol, 1968) has not been very promising so far. Nonetheless, a 
few interesting research directions can be identified. First, the opportunity costs 
can be incorporated in public project evaluation in two ways, viz. by adjusting the 
social rate of discount, or by calculating the shadow prices of public investments 
as the basis for a cost-benefit analysis. In the latter case, the social rate of 
discount may still be an appropriate candidate. Secondly, the various contributions 
to the use of the opportunity costs principle in public investment evaluation tend 
to show a convergence in that the attention is increasingly focused on project-specifie 
elements of opportunity costs. This leads clearly to a greater flexibility in the ana-
lytical framework for judging the social relevance of public projects. 
4.6. Compact literature survey 
The previous findings will now briefly be summarized in a compact overview table. 
In contrast to Table 1, Table 2 includes mainly mutually excluding views. 
authors 
pure oppor-
tunity costs 
(subsection 
4.1) 
crowding-out 
effects 
(subsection 
4.2) 
crowding-out 
and re-invest-
ment effects 
(subsection 4.3) 
second-best 
choices 
(subsection 4.4) 
Arrow (1966) 
Baumol (1968) 
Bradford (1975) 
Hirscheifer(1966) 
Kay (1972) 
Marglin (1963) 
Mendelsohn (1981) 
Stiglitz (1982) 
(+) 
+ 
+ 
+ 
(+) 
(+) 
+ 
+ 
(+) 
+ 
+ 
Table 2. Aspects of opportunity costs dealt with by different authors. 
Baumol (1968) appears to be a special case, as he points out the indeterminacy of the 
social rate of discount for public projects, although he seems to have a slight pre-
ference for the pure opportunity costs principle. Bradford (-1975) and Kay (1972) 
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provide further reflections on Arrow's (1966) contribution. Kay tried to analyze less 
restrictive situations than implied by Arrow's analysis, and also Bradford attempted 
to show that Arrow's conclusion was applicable to a broader set of cases. Mendelsohn 
(1981) however demonstrated that the conclusiorsreached by Kay and Bradford were invalid. 
In a more recent article, Arrow (1982) has analyzed some variants on the model in his 
original article. He concluded that in some cases the marginal rate of return on capital 
could fora an appropriate basis for the social rate of discount. 
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5. Risk Behaviour 
Investment deciaions in both the private and the public sector are always characterizec 
by uncertainties (either in a systematic way or in an unstructured way). In the lite-
rature on risk analysis for public investments various views have been expressed on the 
treatment of risk elements, and these will briefly be discussed here. 
5•1• Risk premium 
The usual view on risk elements in investment behaviour is to add a special risk 
premium to the rate of return in order to cover unforeseen costs. This implies essen-
tially that risky public projects have to be evaluated against a higher discount rate. 
This argumentation runs parallel to the observation that risky assets have. to yield 
higher revenues on the capita! market. One of the backgrounds of this phenomenon is 
that uncertainty reinforces the society's impatience, while it may also reduce the so-
cial value of the investment concerned. Uncertainty is to be regarded as an undesirable 
cost component, so that risky'projects have to pass a higher threshold value in order 
to become acceptable. 
A first problem in this context is of course the precise assessment of the risk. 
Next, the question may be raised whether a risk premium is always adequate. Clearly, 
in case of long-term uncertain benefits this may be an appropriate approach, but in 
case of long-term uncertain costs (e.g., the treatment costs of nuclear waste) a higher 
discount rate leads to an additional neglect of these disadvantages, as then (uncertain) 
future costs in the long run are regarded as less relevant. 
5 • 2. Project-specifie risks 
In various cases, the uncertainties regarding the effects of an investment may have 
an impact on both the costs and the benefits, so that negative and positive elements 
have to be taken into consideration simultaneously. Furthermore, the uncertainties 
regarding costs and benefits may for a specific project exhibit a specific time trajectory 
so that the use of a uniform risk premium is inadequate. In order to compensate for such 
evolutionary effects, either the social rate of discount has to be adjusted (negatively 
or positively) over time for each individual project, or the resulting costs and bene-
fits have to be re-assessed (see Nijkamp and Rouwendal, 1985). 
5.3. External uncertainties 
In addition to lack of insight into the effects (costs and benefits) of the project 
itself, in many cases one faces a situation where uncertain external developments 
(e.g., the growth trajectory of the economy as a whole) exert a significant impact on 
the judgement of the public investments. For instance, if a government is mainly inte-
rested in a stable and steady economie development, an investment which yields relative-
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ly high revenues in a stagnating economy will be preferred to an investment with relative-
ly low benefits in case of economie decline (see also Wilson, 1982). This implies that 
the risk correction for the social rate of discount is co-determined by the correlation 
between the costs or benefits of the project at hand and the development of the economy 
as a whole. 
5.4. Risk differences 
There is a large spectrum of public investment projects, and hence the risks inherent 
in the implementation of such a project are different. Due to'the diversification of 
such risks the revenues of the whole set of risky projects can be predicted more precise-
ly than those of individual projects (see also Samuelson, 1964 and Vickrey, 1964). Conse-
quently, it is sometimes argued that there is no need to add an extra risk premium in the 
form of a mark-up percentage to public projects. 
This argumentation takes for granted that the costs and benefits of the successive 
public projects are neither mutually correlated nor correlated with the general develop-
ment of the economy. This is of course a rather stringent assumption which does not 
always hold true. Another drawback of this argumentation is that it assumes a pooling 
principle of public investments by one and the same government. This is usually not 
the case: there are different financial flows and different public agencies working in 
a pluriform government, so a uniform risk treatment in the public sector is an illusion. 
5.5. Risk distribution 
Another argument against the use of a risk premium in public investments is the fact 
that costs and benefits of such projects are directly or indirectly distributed over 
a large number of persons, so that for each person the risk is almost negligible (see 
Arrow and Lind, 1970). However, two remarks can be made in this respect. First, despite 
the 'large numbers' case of risk.effects there is no guarantee that all risks are equally 
spread over all members of society, so that then a serious distributional problem may 
arise. And secondly, if the government does not correct its decisions for risk elements, 
this may imply that in the long-run too many projects are implemented which should not 
have been accepted in light of the actual risks involved. Such a situation will of 
course - in the long run - be detrimental for the economy as a whole. Finally, it should 
be added that the arguments of risk diversification and distribution hold also for large 
multinational companies. 
5.6. Concluding remarks 
The literature on risk analysis for public investment projects does not exhibit a 
concensus on the treatment of risk premiums. It is increasingly realized however, that 
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6. The Social Rate of Discount: Retrospect 
In the previous sections, 3 main analytical lines have been distinguished for the 
determination and adjustment of the social rate of discount. The results of this sur-
vey do not lead to unambiguous guidelines for the evaluation of long-term public pro-
jects, a situation which was already characterized by Baumol as a'sorry spectacle' 
•(Baumol, 19<68, p. 788). Over a large number of years this debate has not led to 
more consensus, but - on the contrary - to more diversity in opinions (Lind, 1982, p. 10). 
In the meantime the reasons for this divergence have become more clear: the key 
elements of the social rate of discount, viz. the social rate of time preference (co-
determined by the views on the future economie development), the treatment of opportuni-
ty costs, and the treatment of risk and uncertainty, are controversial issues with a 
clear socio-economic and political content. It is worth noting in this context that 
of ten the problems of impact assessment, of monetary transformations into a common de-
nominator, and of time preferences related to a discounting principle are intertwined. 
A clarification of this discussion could probably be attained, if the original 
aim of the discount rate would be kept in mind. This aim is: to create a systematic 
comparision framework for cross-temporal financial flows related to alternative public 
investments. The social rate of discount has not been developed to take into account 
opportunity costs or risk elements. Only in a later stage of the discussion it was 
argued that the social rate of discount might be adjusted for such aspects. In our 
view, it is preferable to deal with the social rate of discount in its original pure 
form as the social rate of time preference. 
Opportunity costs might then be taken into account via the abovementioned correction 
mechanism based on the assessment of shadow prices and the adjustment of costs and bene-
fits accordingly. Risk elements might be included by assessing for the uncertain costs 
and benefits the certainty equivalence in each period, viz. the amount of compensation 
which has the same value for society as the set of uncertain costs and benefits. 
Such approaches do not eliminate all problems inherent in risk elements and oppor-
tunity costs, but they lead to a more appropriate interpretation and use of the social 
rate of discount. The social rate of discount itself is still hard to assess, as it has 
to reflect the social rate of time preference. It is a plausible assumption that the 
social rate of discount is lower than the market rate of interest, but its precise 
value is still a sourceof rational speculation among economists. This also means that 
cost-benefit analysis is suffering from the same problems, although in many cases re-
sults from sensitivity analyses with regard the social rate of discount may provide 
- within certain limits - a reliable basis for public investment decisions. In the 
next section, some further reflections on the social rate of discount based on a 
welfare approach will be given. 
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7. The Social Rate of Discount: A Welfare-Theoretic Approach 
Various authors have already advocated the use of a flexible social rate of dis-
count, which should depend on the duration period of the project, the political concern 
for the next generation, and specific effects or features of the project at hand. 
In the present section, the issue of time preference will be further discussed by 
adopting a social welfare perspective for the planning of long-term public projects. 
It will be indicated that - under fairly general conditions - a variable discount rate 
is in agreement with a social welfare approach. Most of the arguments used in this 
section are based on Nijkamp and Rouwendal (1985). 
One may assume a social welfare function W with income (or consumption) tevels 
I (t=l,...,T) as arguments: 
W = W(Ir..,IT) 
For project evaluation we have to determine the difference in welfare between the 
with and without situations: 
AW = W' - W° 
If the sign of AW is positive the execution of the project increases social wel-
fare, if it is negative the project decreases welfare. If the effects of the pro-
ject are relatively small we may approximate AW as: 
T 
AW = Z •££- AI 
t=l 3It t 
In the equation AI is equal to^the net benefits associated with the project in 
period t. It is thus equal to B - C in our earlier formula (section 2). 
Indeed one may now regard this equation as a welfare-theoretic formulation for 
the net present value equation In section 2. It can be derived that the implied rate 
of discount is determined by: 
._,_ 3W , 3W 1+r = — / 
t ait_, 3it 
By adopting this welfare theoretic framework one may treat in a formal and explicit 
way the influence of income growth, additional care for future generations, and risk 
on the rate of discount. For details we refer to Nijkamp and Rouwendal (1985). 
The social welfare approach is in our view a relevant one for discussing and 
analyzing the issues related to the rate of discount. Although it is usually stated 
that the net present value criterion cannot take into account the interests of the 
next generation, as the multi-temporal weights are declining over time and vanish in 
the end (cf. Myers, 1977), it can be shown by this type of analysis that, by adopting 
a variable rate of discount, this is certainly possible 
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Similar conclusions may be reached for risk elements and externalities. 
One conclusion that may be derived from this analysis is that the appropriate 
treatment of risk and opportunity costs very often necessitates a project-specifie 
determination of the rate of discount. For policy-making it may be convenient 
to treat this project-specifie concerns apart from the rate of discount. These 
project-specifie concerns might then be dealt with in the determination of the 
cash-flows. 
The specification of the appropriate rate of discount should in this view take 
place on the basis of more general considerations by which it is possible to assign 
the projects to a few broad classes (on the basis of risk, duration etc.) each with 
their own specifie value of the rate of discount. 
In this way the general aspects of time preference, risk, opportunity costs etc. 
are incorporated in the value of the rate of discount while the project-specifie 
ones are dealt with by means of adjustments of the cash - flow estimates (e.g. 
by the use of shadow prices). By proceeding in this way it may be possible to take 
into account the insights gained from the theoretical reflections that can be found 
in the literature, while at the same time it remains possible to use general and 
feasible guidelines for project evaluation by means of discounting. Clearly, in 
case of intangible or incommensurable project effects, this approach is still 
fraught with difficulties, but the latter case complementary directions (e.g., 
multiple criteria analyses) have to be chosen. 
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